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Highway and bridge construction on interstate highways, U.S. highway routes, and 
state highways is partially funded by federal gasoline taxes and administered by the 
individual state departments of transportation.   In 1983 the U.S. government instituted 
legislation that increased the opportunity for disadvantaged business enterprise (DBE) firms 
to participate in federally-funded highway construction.  After subsequent evolution, this 
legislation remains the subject of debate due to its economic impact and social implications. 
Some industry participants characterize the DBE program as inefficient because of 
the perception that DBE project participation goals create higher project costs and 
administrative burden.  The price paid to achieve an equity objective is known as a shadow 
cost. This paper examines whether DBE participation goals imposed shadow costs to 
Tennessee highway projects during the years 2005 - 2008.  
This question is considered against a backdrop of the political economics of the 
policies behind the goals. Measuring a shadow cost is relevant to efficiency and public 
policy.  Since highway construction funding comes from federal and state gasoline tax 
revenue, nearly all Tennessee and U.S. motorists are affected. 
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Introduction, History, and Background 
Introduction 
One definition of efficiency is achieving production at the lowest possible cost. Using 
this definition, the market for subcontractor services in Tennessee highway construction is 
suspected to be inefficient because of federal legislation mandating that disadvantaged 
business enterprise (DBE) firms receive a percentage of federal transportation contracting 
funds. By legislating that DBE firms be assured a portion of federally-funded highway 
construction, the government may have increased the cost of roads and bridges to the 
taxpayer in order to achieve equity in the contracting market.  The price paid to achieve an 
equity objective is known as a shadow cost.  
According to the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT), DBEs are 
for-profit small business concerns where socially and economically disadvantaged 
individuals own at least a 51 percent interest and control management and daily business 
operations.  Mandated DBE participation represents a government directive and social policy 
intended to prevent discrimination and to provide equal opportunity.  Rational thinking 
supports these goals but healthy debate exists on the efficiency of the current program. The 
efficiency question has significant economic interest and demands closer scrutiny.  What 
increases in taxpayer costs might occur from mandating DBE participation?  In other words, 
is a shadow cost incurred to achieve the societal goals? 
Highway and bridge construction is a significant portion of federal transportation 
contracting exceeding $35 billion per year. Highway and bridge construction as well as 
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maintenance on interstates, U.S. highway routes, and state routes is partially funded by 
federal gasoline taxes.  The individual state departments of transportation administer the 
work. 
Tennessee is a typical state in highway construction.  The Tennessee Department of 
Transportation (TDOT) had a 2009 federal fiscal year (FFY 2009)
1
 budget in excess of $1.8 
billion with more than $700 million targeted for highway and bridge construction and 
established a FFY 2009 goal of 8.73
2
 percent DBE participation.  Tennessee‟s allocation of 
federal transportation funds comes from the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) as enacted August 10, 2005 
as Public Law 109-59.  SAFETEA-LU authorizes the federal surface transportation programs 
for 2005-2009.   
In recent years, many of the industry‟s large contractors have scrutinized the DBE 
program as inefficient because of the perception that DBE firms raise project costs.
3
  Beyond 
this perception, definite effects on larger prime contractors include additional costs incurred 
in bidding and increased project management overhead owing to mandated DBE 
participation. TDOT, other state agencies, and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) 
also incur additional administrative expenses to maintain and manage these programs.
4
 These 
                                                 
1
 FFY 2009 spans from October 2008 thru September 2009. 
 
2
 Goal furnished by the TDOT Civil Rights Division. 
3
 The author was previously employed in the Tennessee highway construction industry from 1993-2003.  This 
observation comes from his interaction with many contractors during that period and from subsequent 
conversations in researching this topic. 
 
4
 A 2001 U.S. General Accounting Office (also known as the GAO and renamed in 2004 as the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office) report estimated $6 million for the U.S. Department of Transportation in 
FFY 2000 and state averages exceeding $1 million. 
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additional administrative costs, paid by taxpayers, could be explained by voter choice models 
where society chooses to trade the cost of a policy (e.g. affirmative action) in exchange for a 
desirable goal. Applying this model, voters have chosen to promote equal opportunity in an 
industry where statistical evidence indicates firms owned by minorities and women have 
historically not been proportionally represented. An alternate perspective is found in a self-
interest model that explains governmental regulation as being sought by groups to restrict 
competition in their industry.  Both models suggest mandated DBE participation may raise 
prices.  However other literature indicates affirmative action can reduce costs and all these 
perspectives will be examined in more detail later.  
Before beginning the analysis, I intend to review the history of the legislation and 
judicial decisions which formed the current program that might lead to production 
inefficiency.  Most real-life questions are not considered within a single realm and this 
efficiency question is no exception.  Normative and positive economics often provide 
different answers to policy questions.  Whereas my analysis is in the positive realm, 
normative economics allows for an inefficient production outcome given the presence of 
social benefits in pursuing equity.  
 National Legislative History and Court Challenges 
Recognizing past discrimination, the federal government intervened with legislation 
to provide better opportunities for these disadvantaged groups. Not only have DBE firms 
traditionally been denied participation opportunities, they continue to struggle with equal 
access to capital.  A review of federal legislation and significant judicial decisions provides a 
starting point for understanding the possible existence of an inefficient production market 
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and ultimately weighing any inefficiency versus social benefits in accordance with a 
normative framework.  
 In 1982 the U.S. government first instituted legislation (to become effective in 1983) 
increasing the opportunity for minority businesses to participate in all federally-funded 
transportation contracting by enacting the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA).  
This act provided the opportunity for qualified minority-owned businesses to participate in a 
USDOT program designated as the Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) Program.  It 
was expanded in 1987 to include female-owned businesses and codified within Title 49 Code 
of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) Part 23. 
The program, administered by the FHWA, indicated that 10 percent of the funds 
authorized for federal and highway assistance should be channeled to DBE firms. 
Reauthorization of the program occurred under the George H.W. Bush administration in 
1991-92.  Although some revisions were periodically made in the finer details, the 10 percent 
provision remained constant and began to incur legal challenges.  In spite of such challenges, 
the program was reinstituted by the 1998 Transportation Equity Act for the 21
st
 Century 
(TEA-21) and expanded by the Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2005. Though I shall 
consider only that portion applicable to highways, similar federal programs currently exist 
for aviation and transit under the USDOT‟s Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business 
Utilization (OSDBU). 
The legal challenges, examined in greater detail below, resulted in the replacement of 
Part 23 by a new regulation designated 49 C.F.R. Part 26. Part 26 eliminated the 10 percent 
mandate and provided the more narrowly tailored provision the courts demanded. The courts 
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acted because this controversial legislation prompted several challenges from affected 
contractors over the years.  Two of these cases merit mention because they changed the 
nature of the program over time. 
The first significant case, City of Richmond v. J.A. Crosun Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), 
was brought by the plaintiff contractor alleging that minority set-aside contracts were 
discriminatory against non-minority contractors.  The Supreme Court‟s decision in support of 
the contractor resulted in the dissolution of numerous local set-aside programs and set the 
stage for a new era in affirmative action. 
The landmark case, Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), a 5 to 4 
decision extended the strict scrutiny standard to federal programs.  The Supreme Court 
decreed that government programs must have a compelling interest in remedying past 
discrimination, be narrowly tailored to avoid benefitting those not suffering from past 
discrimination, and bring no harm to innocent third parties. As a result of all the challenges, 
CFR Part 26 was enacted to „mend not end the program‟ in 1999. 
Background-DBE Goals  
By eliminating the arbitrary 10 percent participation standard, Part 26 complies with 
the strict scrutiny of the Supreme Court‟s Adarand decision. States are allowed to establish 
individual participation goals based upon achieving DBE participation at its „natural level‟.  
This natural level is defined as that amount which would be present absent of any 
discrimination.  In practice, states may establish annual goals based upon any reasonable 
methodology and it is common to use information from the Census Bureau County Business 
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Pattern database and other sources considering the number of ready, willing, and able firms 
in the market.  
Historical Standards and Goals 
Prior to 1999, recipients of federal aid were required to achieve the 10 percent goal or 
offer justification to the USDOT. The 1999 DBE regulations made significant changes.  The 
new regulations overhauled the program‟s goal setting process, including the use of race-
neutral measures and revised its eligibility requirements with a cap on owner‟s net worth. 
The 1999 regulations resulting from Adarand  also brought varying state goals. In a 
broad sense, note that minority participation rises and falls with the establishment of goals.  
A 1997 Urban Institute Study found that the termination of Michigan‟s state-funded program 
resulted in minority participation dropping to zero while the state‟s federal program achieved 
12.7 percent participation.  
Part 26 affected goals in other ways as well.  While relaxing the 10 percent 
requirement, it instituted more rigorous standards in terms of both DBE qualification and 
revised definitions of what constitutes project participation.  DBE certification requires that 
owners submit a Personal Net Worth (PNW) statement and the PNW of owners must be less 
than $750,000 exclusive of their home or ownership in the business.  More intrusive financial 
disclosure requirements seem to have resulted in a loss of certified DBE entities in 
Tennessee.
5
  In addition, Part 26 contained provisions which disallowed the previously 
acceptable practice of a DBE subcontracting to a second tier non-DBE and counting the 
subcontracted amount towards participation goals. So Part 26 modifications made it more 
                                                 
5
 According to the TDOT Civil Rights Office. 
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difficult for firms to achieve certification and for states to achieve annual goals at previous 
levels. Tightened certification requirements certainly diminished the supply of available DBE 
firms.  It is feasible that this reduced supply has an effect on project costs and the efficiency 
of this market.  If this effect is significant, higher costs might result from reduced 
competition among DBE firms. 
Obviously this legislation has evolved considerably since its 1983 inception. The 
changing nature highlights the controversy it has spawned and continues to generate. Given 
the historical perspective, we move to the current standards and Tennessee goals pertinent to 
the analysis herein. 
Current Standards and Goals - Tennessee 
Since Part 26 allows the individual states to establish their own annual goals using 
any reasonable methodology, recent Tennessee DBE participation goals have ranged between 
a high of 9.87 percent in FFY 2007 to a low of 8.00 percent in FFY 2005
6
 as shown in Figure 
A1 (refer to the appendices for this and all subsequent figures and tables).  Noteworthy is the 
fact that goals can be met by a combination of race-conscious and race-neutral participation.  
Race-neutral is defined as that participation which occurs without the establishment of race 
or gender project goals. Tennessee, along with most other states, meets approximately one-
third of its annual goal using race-neutral means. This is noteworthy because race-neutral 
participation occurs without mandate and can be assumed to occur in a competitive 
environment (see Figure A2). 
                                                 
6
 Goals furnished by the TDOT Civil Rights Division. 
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In addition to its annual goal, TDOT establishes participation goals for approximately 
20 percent of its individual projects based upon the local marketplace and subcontractor 
availability.  In practice, these goals are actually minimum requirements for DBE firm 
participation and constitute a mandate.  It is these project goals that are my focus. 
In establishing these project participation goals, special weight is given to the 
availability of DBE subcontractors in conjunction with the specific types of work required.  
In-state DBE firms dominate the actual participation but approximately one hundred out-of-
state firms have Tennessee certification.   
Now that I have established the background for the current policy and its social goals, 
I need to establish background knowledge of the industry under consideration.  My analysis 
is confined to the subcontracting market as it pertains to highway and road construction 
within the state of Tennessee from January 2005 until October 2008.   
Background- Tennessee Highway Construction 
In highway construction, Tennessee is believed to be a typical state in most respects.  
Sizeable projects include major work items of paving, grading, bridge construction, and 
several common minor elements.  To understand the elements of my analysis, clarity of the 
contractual relationships between the parties and the roles of the parties is essential.  This 
knowledge will facilitate the reader‟s understanding and acceptance of the key assumptions 
in the econometric analysis. 
TDOT is headquartered in Nashville with several divisions including: Planning, 
Design, Structures, Construction, Civil Rights, and Maintenance. Size and geographic 
considerations dictate that daily operational functions are managed at the regional or district 
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level.  Please refer to Figure A3 which shows the geographic delineation of state regions. My 
research question involves the state-level Construction and Civil Rights Divisions located in 
Nashville.  
The Construction Division conducts the bid auctions and awards the contracts to the 
lowest qualified bidder in unit price contract (UPC) auctions. DBE participation goals are 
established by the Civil Rights and Construction Divisions on individual projects using 
various criteria such as project size, location, composition, and proximity to available DBE 
entities. The Civil Rights Division monitors DBE project goal compliance. Projects are 
awarded to the lowest qualified bidder in sealed bid UPC auctions that are held eight times 
per year. The two major participants in the auction process are TDOT and the bidding prime 
contractors. Seldom do DBE firms bid as prime contractors, instead they are typically 
involved in the auction process only indirectly.  They participate by quoting prices on 
consulting services, project materials, or the subcontracting of selected work items.  In 
practice, the overwhelming majority of DBE participation is through subcontracted work and 
hereafter I refer to the mechanism of participation as DBE subcontracting.  The 
subcontractor‟s quoted prices are used by the prime contractors in formulating bids. 
Tennessee Department of Transportation (TDOT) 
In conducting the UPC auctions, TDOT receives sealed bids and then chooses to 
award the project to the lowest responsive bidder or reject all bids. In a UPC auction, a 
typical job is delineated into many bid items such as guardrail, pavement marking, asphalt 
paving, etc. which comprise the bid schedule.  Each item on the bid schedule has a bid 
quantity thought to be a correct approximation of the actual project quantities. Bidding prime 
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contractors submit a unit price for each bid item.  Item totals are then summed to get the total 
bid amount.  The bidder with the lowest total bid is the auction winner. The winner chooses 
his subcontractors based upon their quoted prices and perceived reliability but must have 
sufficient DBE participation to meet the mandated project requirements even if lower cost or 
more reliable alternatives exist. 
In addition to the auction mechanics, my analysis of shadow cost will incorporate 
relevant project specific characteristics. Among them are the general types of construction 
work performed.  Large road building projects consist of three primary components.  They 
include grading activities (earth moving), paving, and bridge construction.  In addition to the 
major work areas, smaller work elements exist such as guardrail installation, pavement 
marking, signalization, signing, temporary traffic control, and landscaping.  Often, medium 
size projects include only the resurfacing of existing roads to replace deteriorated pavement.  
TDOT provides project information to the bidding contractors in design drawings and 
specifications. An additional TDOT responsibility is to prepare the engineering cost estimate 
(ECE) prior to the auction.  This estimate is fundamental to my analysis and discussed in 
more detail later. 
Highway Contractors and Subcontractors 
Generally a prime contractor will conduct one or more of the major work elements 
with his or her own forces and subcontract ancillary elements to other firms (sometimes 
known as the „make vs. buy‟ decision).
7
  These generally smaller entities perform specific 
work segments under the management of the prime contractor.  In compiling the bid prices, 
                                                 
7
 Without mandated participation, prime contractors may choose to perform more work with their own forces or 
„make vs. buy‟ decision.   
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the prime contractor solicits price quotes on the minor areas of work from DBE and non-
DBE subcontractors. 
Tennessee DBE subcontractors are generally concentrated in areas of work such as 
guardrail installation, pavement marking, trucking, and landscaping because these areas of 
work tend to have the lowest barriers for entry in both capital and industry experience.  In 
fact, TDOT seems to encourage DBE entry in these areas (Figure A4).  
Bidding prime contractors are prequalified and the job (if awarded) goes to the lowest 
bidder.  Since only the low bidder can receive the award, prime contractors have a strong 
incentive to choose subcontractors having the lowest unit prices.  A notable exception occurs 
if a contractor fails to meet the minimum requirement for DBE participation when utilizing 
the lowest prices available.   In this instance, a contractor may be compelled to utilize a 
higher price quote from a DBE subcontractor to meet a project DBE participation goal.  
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Chapter 2  
Research Question 
As of the year 2000, 99 percent of the states and transit authorities surveyed by the 
GAO had not conducted studies to determine whether the DBE program affected their 
contracting cost. With annual spending currently in the billions, federal transportation 
contracting is an economic engine and significant funds are being received by Tennessee 
DBE highway subcontractors.   During the study period, DBE firms received almost $50 
million annually.
8
 Given similar goals in all states, the national flow to DBE firms exceeds 
$2 billion annually in highway construction alone. Measuring the DBE program‟s effect on 
contracting costs will determine if the program is costly to taxpayers.  
Economic Significance of Participation Goals 
  The rigid qualification process for DBE subcontractors limits entry and restricts 
competition while project participation goals are a constraint on the prime contractor‟s choice 
of subcontractors.  Assuming DBE firms exhibit higher costs and this constraint binds, DBE 
project goals impose a shadow cost on taxpayers.  However it is possible that there are 
offsetting influences such as non-DBE firms bidding more aggressively that might counter 
this effect. Investigating the cost effects of the DBE program is relevant to public policy and 
can assist policy makers in directing the program‟s future.   
Since funding comes from federal and state gasoline tax revenue, nearly all 
Tennessee motorists are affected.  This topic becomes timelier as the federal government has 
                                                 
8
 Based on an 8 percent minimum annual goal with $600 million average annual expenditures. 
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recently instituted a two-year economic stimulus package giving Tennessee $572 million for 
highway construction in addition to its annual allocation under SAFETEA-LU. 
Perceptions of Participation Goals and Potential Goal Impacts 
Evidence exists supporting the highway community‟s perception that DBE firms 
command higher prices because of their certification status.  Marion (2006) states that it is 
commonly accepted that „front‟ companies exist.  These fronts are white and male-controlled 
but DBE certified.  Since their existence constitutes fraud, the incentive to form these 
companies logically lends credence to the perception that mandated participation goals affect 
prices.  Higher prices might occur because of lack of scale, lack of access to capital, and the 
lower productivity of newer, less-experienced firms.   
Goal impacts potentially include positive and negative effects both direct and those 
somewhat more subtle.  Potential negative effects include not only increased project costs but 
less obvious effects such as the elimination of opportunities for non-DBE white males. The 
costs of positive impacts are the shadow costs. Positive benefits, though difficult to quantify 
in monetary terms, are the social benefits achieved through diversity and equal opportunity 
for the disadvantaged. Even opponents of the current program acknowledge that past 
discrimination existed.  Leveling the playing field could create positive externalities that 
provide justification for potentially increasing taxpayer costs. This normative perspective fits 
perfectly with median voter choice models. 
If mandated DBE participation raises total project costs, the normative policy debate 
will continue among factions.  If this perception is false, then project costs are impacted only 
indirectly by increasing administrative burden on government and the industry.  Since costs 
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of the burden are minimal, all factions would likely accept them. I intend to analyze costs 




Chapter 3  
Literature Review 
Relevant literature falls into two broad categories.  In the general literature, we see 
theories explaining the origins of regulatory policy and we find specific literature on the 
effect of affirmative action on highway costs in other states.  A brief discussion of both types 
will be helpful in framing the principal questions of this paper and understanding the 
implications of its findings. 
Public choice models like the median voter model represent one possible path for 
policy development. Congleton (2008) discusses the rational view that market failures may 
be corrected by voter demands. His Moral Voter Hypothesis asserts that normative theories 
can predict outcomes that depart from self-interest. We see the parallels to the DBE program 
where the federal government corrected a market failure with legislation demanded by a 
voting public. However Congleton (2002) explains that just because the median voter gets his 
wishes, the outcome is not necessarily Pareto efficient. As I explore the possibility that a 
shadow cost exists and there is production inefficiency, Congleton‟s work provides a 
plausible explanation for this combination. 
An alternate explanation of policy adoption is found in a self-interest model by 
Stigler (1971).  His writing on the economic theory of regulation explores how government 
regulation may actually be sought by an industry. By achieving legislation which reduces 
available supply and limits substitutes, an industry can affect an increase in prices.  Though 
his work extends further, Stigler points out how some regulations create costs as a trade for 
some social goal.  He concludes that industries receiving protection from the state will 
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achieve benefits less than the damage to the rest of the community and that regulation creates 
higher prices.  
Both the median voter and self-interest models support the possibility of higher costs 
but do not assure them since other literature (discussed below) explains that affirmative 
action programs can decrease prices.  However we have evidence of programs increasing 
costs in other highway-specific literature. Despite the narrow nature of this topic, the effect 
of governmental regulation on highway costs has previously been explored in other states.  
Some of the parallel work by Marion (2007) deals with bid preferences in California highway 
contracting where small businesses are given a 5 percent preference on state road 
construction projects but not federal projects. Marion explores the effect of these preferences 
and finds that though winning firm‟s profits are reduced, overall costs increase 3.8 percent 
because of reduced participation in the preference auctions by larger firms.  Larger low cost 
firms merely substitute the non-preference federal auctions and the resultant efficiency loss is 
3.6 percent or 27 cents of each dollar awarded to small firms in preference auctions.  It is 
noteworthy that a fundamental difference between the bid preference auctions and DBE 
subcontracting goals is that bid preferences facilitate participation but do not mandate it 
when the cost differential exceeds a threshold value.  It is reasonable to assume low cost 
firms are more likely to forego auctions when participation is mandated.  
Marion‟s (2006) most relevant work considers the costs of affirmative action after 
California adopted legislation to eliminate preferential treatment to minority and female 
businesses on state (but not federal) road projects.  This natural experiment provided a ready 
control group to facilitate analysis of the costs of affirmative action. He determined that the 
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elimination of affirmative action goals caused prices to fall by 5.6 percent on state projects 
relative to federal projects. Marion‟s results indicate that an increase of 10 percent in DBE 
participation increased the winning bid by 3.1 percent and the elimination of preferential 
treatment lowered prices because of the fewer subcontractors utilized (make vs. buy 
decision) and the mix of subcontractors chosen.
9
 
Other work by Corns and Schotter (1999) and McAfee and McMillan (1989) suggest 
that an affirmative action program that uses bid preferences for disadvantaged firms could, in 
fact, lower the equilibrium winning bid if it forces non-disadvantaged firms to bid more 
aggressively. Therefore affirmative action does not necessarily increase costs. McAfee and 
McMillan also show that even cases where bid preferences have adverse cost effects are not 
necessarily suboptimal if the favored group‟s profits enter positively into the social welfare 
function. Hence we see the theoretical possibility that regulations can both enhance 
competition and produce positive externalities.  
 
 
                                                 
9
Marion found DBE subcontractors tend to be concentrated in urban areas.  Their urban locations tend to create 
higher average costs though not necessarily higher than non-DBE firms in the same locale. With the flexibility 
to choose a different mix (including lower cost subs in non-urban areas), overall project costs were lowered. 
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Chapter 4  
Theory and Analysis 
Theoretical Framework 
The literature review gave two theories explaining the possible existence of higher 
prices from regulation.  Congleton‟s Moral Voter Hypothesis indicates politicians will take 
policy positions in accordance with the preferences of their constituents even if costs are 
increased and Stigler‟s seminal paper on the economic theory of regulation posits that 
industries seek regulation that controls entry and limits substitutes for the purpose of 
increasing prices. 
While these theories offer an explanation for the origin of the DBE program, 
microeconomic theory and econometric analysis is required to examine the cost effects.  I 
begin with a fundamental assumption regarding the cost structure of DBE firms. It is entirely 
reasonable that DBEs have higher average and marginal cost structures because of their 
generally smaller size, lack of capital, and relative inexperience so any mandate raising their 
level of participation raises costs ceteris paribus.  
It is also possible that DBE firms have higher, lower, or the same average costs but 
are able to earn economic rent because their participation is mandated. At least two 
possibilities exist that might enable DBE subcontractors to command higher prices from a 
lessening of competition.  The DBE certification might act as a „license‟ similar to those held 
by importers where import quotas exist or DBE firms may have crowded out non-DBE, 
 
19 
lower cost firms in certain sectors and specific geographic areas.
10
 On the other hand, it is 
possible that their participation causes non-DBE subcontractors to price more aggressively 
and that overall project costs decrease in accordance with the literature discussed earlier. 
A way to understand and frame the analysis is found in the microeconomic concept of 
constrained optimization. The project participation requirement can be considered a 
constraint on the lowest cost objective function.  If this constraint binds, the lowest bid price 
increases and the effect of the constraint can be measured as a shadow cost. Do limited entry, 
restriction of substitutes, and mandated participation goals create a shadow cost? Using the 
auction mechanics and industry characteristics, I intend to formulate an econometric model 
to answer these questions. 
Elements of Analysis 
Before receiving bids, TDOT compiles an engineering cost estimate (ECE) of the 
expected project cost.  This carefully prepared estimate is used for budgeting and also 
subsequently used as a basis to insure that the received bids are a true representation of the 
fair value of the auction.  The preparation of this estimate involves an extension of expected 
unit prices and quantities for project work items.  The TDOT Construction Division indicated 
that estimates are prepared in advance of the establishment of project participation goals and 
                                                 
10
 TDOT states that there are no indications that any overconcentration exists and discounts the latter possibility.  





are in theory not explicitly biased.
11
  In other words, TDOT estimators do not try to account 
for the effect of any goals when deriving their estimates.  
If the estimates do not assume higher DBE average costs, my analysis should be 
unbiased.  The other possibility is that the ECE implicitly incorporates some effect based on 
historical cost data and creates a bias.  However if the analysis indicates a shadow cost, such 
a bias only enhances the conclusion. 
A shadow cost will result if DBE participation goals and higher costs create a binding 
constraint that prevents achieving the lowest auction price. I test the following null 
hypothesis: 
H0:  DBE project participation goals affect the winning bid of Tennessee highway 
projects. 
 
With an alternate hypothesis of: 
 
H1: DBE project participation goals have no effect on the winning bid of 
Tennessee highway projects. 
  
                                                 
11




Chapter 5  
Econometrics  
The qualitative benefits from DBE participation such as industry diversity and equal 
opportunity are noble goals but not subject to quantitative evaluation and are highly 
subjective.  Other quantitative measurements as to the success and progress of program 
participants would require firm and owner financial data currently protected by federal law, 
but I can examine the existence and magnitude of a shadow cost with available data.  To 
quantify how changes in DBE participation goals across projects affect project costs, 
consider the following model used by Marion: 
    (1) 
 
where ln (Bidi) is the log of the winning bid,   is the project participation goal,   is a 
vector of project specific characteristics, and  represents unobserved time shocks. 
Using  observations of  Tennessee highway bid data from the period January 2005 
thru October 2008, the econometric analysis controls for project characteristics (the number 
of bids received, the type  and character of work, geographic location, etc.) and time sensitive 
factors (price shocks, change in state annual goals, etc.). The analysis variables are found in 
Table A1. 
1085 observations were obtained with 207 observations having a DBE project 
participation goal ranging from 3 to 10 percent. Please refer to Tables A2 and A3 for 
summary statistics.  The former pertains to the entire data set and the latter references a 
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reduced set of projects (see discussion below).  Figures A5 and A6 indicate the distribution 
of the two groups into size categories.    
Stata 10 provided a multiple regression package utilized in the analysis.  An OLS 
robust regression was performed by regressing the variable of interest, dbegoal, and project 
controls on the log of the winning auction bid.  In accordance with Marion‟s model, the 
logarithmic forms of the independent variables were typically utilized for quantity variables.  
Logarithmic forms reduce the effect of outlying observations and coefficient estimates reflect 
elasticities.    
A key decision regarding the OLS choice concerns the potential endogeneity of 
dbegoal. Should this variable be endogenous, OLS results would be biased.  After careful 
consideration, I argue dbegoal  is not endogenous because of the assumption on another key 
explanatory variable.  The variable lestamt is the log of the ECE.  Note that this estimate is 
made by TDOT with essentially the same information available to the bidding contractors.  
The differences in information include the dbegoal value, the actual completion time allotted, 
general time shocks that might occur subsequent to the TDOT estimate but before the 
bidding, and the winning bidder‟s competitive position (firm backlog, backlog of major 
competitors, distance to the project, etc.).  My analytical framework controls for all of the 
above information differences except certain aspects of the competitive position which 
remain in the error term.  Logically, dbegoal  cannot be correlated with these competitive 
aspects and is not endogenous. Therefore the OLS estimator is BLUE.  As noted earlier, if 
lestamt implicitly incorporates higher historical prices, a positive slope coefficient on 
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dbegoal contains attenuation (toward zero) bias but this bias would strengthen a rejection of 
the null hypothesis. 
Other analytical decisions warrant mention.  Preliminary results indicated that the 
winning bidder‟s distance from the project and a proxy variable for project completion time 
were insignificant with no explanatory power. Both were dropped from the final analysis to 
avoid over-specifying the model.
12
  However, the most debatable decision was to estimate 
the model without certain observations determined to be from a different population. 
In compiling the data, I noted observations where winning bids were below $100,000.  
Based upon personal experience with the auctions, I questioned the nature of these 
observations.  Upon further review, it appears these observations come from a different 
population.  The population of interest is Tennessee highway construction subcontracting as 
it pertains the construction of roads and bridges.  These 46 observations included highly 
atypical projects such as the construction of salt bins and the cleaning of tunnels while only a 
single observation in the questionable group contained paving or grading.  These small 
projects do not represent opportunities for DBE construction subcontracting borne out by the 
fact that eliminating these observations did not eliminate a single DBE project goal job.  In 
addition, these jobs have minimal economic impact.  In the study period, the 1085 
observations totaled approximately $2.4 billion of value. While these 46 observations 
constituted almost 5 percent of total observations, they represent less than 0.2 percent of 
value. I conclude these observations come from a different population and are irrelevant to 
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 Introductory Econometrics, Woolridge, p. 211. 
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my analysis. The results including them are meaningless but I report them in Appendix B to 
be consistent with recognized econometric practices.
13
  
Regression Results – Full Data Set - 1085 observations 
I performed a preliminary regression on the variables listed in Table A1.  Summary 
statistics for the full data set are found in Table A2. The regression results show little of 
interest but can be found in Table B1.  The coefficient on the variable of interest, dbegoal, 
has the expected sign but is insignificant.  As expected, lestamt and qtybids are highly 
significant.  Other explanatory variables related to the allowable completion time and the 
winner‟s geographic proximity to the project, ltime and biddist, both lack significance.  I 
dropped the latter two explanatory variables and repeated the regression. These results 
remain uninteresting but are given in Table B2.  Both regressions yielded similar results 
confirming my decision to eliminate ltime and biddist. In both regressions, the coefficient on 
dbegoal remains insignificant.   
Regression Results with Atypical Observations eliminated – 1039 observations 
Eliminating the smallest 46 observations (projects less than $100,000) increased the 
average winning bid slightly from $2.11 million to $2.20 million with minimal effects on 
other numerical variables.  However this modification yielded substantially different 
regression results for dbegoal. These results, shown in Table A4, show a slope coefficient of 
0.380 for dbegoal.  This coefficient indicates an increase in the winning bid price of 3.80 
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 Ibid, p.328. 
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percent for an increase of 0.1 in dbegoal (10 percent in the project DBE goal). Since dbegoal  
has a t-statistic of 1.87 and a p-value equal to 0.06, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that  
DBE subcontractor participation project goals affect project costs at the 10 percent 
significance level but I reject the null at the 5 percent significance level. 
Coefficients on the other two previously significant explanatory variables, lestamt 
and qtybids remain highly significant with p-values less than 0.01.  The overall R-squared 
value of 0.979 reflects the highly significant t-statistics of 145.0 and -6.81 for these two 
significant variables.  The standard error of the regression is 0.163 and the Breusch-Pagan 
test confirmed the choice for robust regression with a chi-squared value of 29.1 and I reject 
the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity at a significance level less than 1 percent. 
It is interesting to note that the dummy variable coefficient for TDOT Region 4 is 
 -0.048 and highly significant with a t-statistic of -3.26 indicating a geographic cost 
difference. Though not statistically significant, Regions 2 and 3 also had coefficients of 
negative signs.  All coefficients were with respect to Region 1 which was omitted in the 
analysis to avoid the dummy variable trap. 
Further Regression Results – 1039 Observations 
The above results on dbegoal narrowly missed being significant at the 5 percent level 
and included a likely attenuation bias. To obtain more information, an alternate regression 
was considered.  Whereas the previous regression considered marginal effects, it did not 
provide information on the average effect of DBE participation goals.  In order to consider 
these average effects, I used the following model: 
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    (2) 
 
where  is a dummy variable having a value of one for projects with DBE participation 
goals and zero otherwise.  Other variables are as in Equation (1). Results are listed in Table 
A5 where the coefficient on the dummy participation goal variable, dbepart, is 0.041 (an 
average price increase of 4.1 percent) with a t-statistic of 2.85 (p<0.01) and highly 
significant.  Coefficients on the other significant explanatory variables remain significant at 
their previous levels.   
As a final experiment to validate the analysis, I considered an alternate specification 
for the marginal effect which removed lestamt as an explanatory variable.  With such strong 
predictive power, this variable has the potential to overshadow the variable of interest.  The 
alternate specification considered a new dependent variable created by subtracting lestamt 
from laward (or dividing the award amount by the ECE and taking the log of the result).  
Results of this regression closely corresponded with the original model. Using the same data 
set of 1039 observations and retaining the other variables, the coefficient on dbegoal was 
0.420 at a confidence level exceeding 95 percent.  Taking this robustness experiment an 
additional step, I eliminated the 104 smallest observations for laward (award amounts less 
than $250,000) because they do not represent any DBE participation projects.  This 
regression yielded a dbegoal slope coefficient of 0.335 with a t-statistic of 1.96 (and a p-
value = 0.05).    
Removing lestamt as an explanatory variable definitely reflected its explanatory 
power as the removal caused the overall R-squared value to fall sharply to a value less than 
0.2 and the remaining explanatory variables to be measured in a different context.  The 
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experimental results do nothing to cast doubt on the results of the original model. Since they 




Chapter 6  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The feasible set of available subcontractors on goal projects is reduced by 
participation requirements which serve to eliminate some non-DBE firms from consideration.  
In addition, there are fewer DBE subcontractors available in recent years because of more 
stringent qualification procedures. In 2008, there were 156 Tennessee firms listed as having 
certified DBE status and fewer still were active.
14
   
Logically it could be expected that the population centers of the state, with their 
higher minority populations, would have a greater number of DBE subcontracting 
participants in a more competitive environment. Note that Region 4 (Memphis region) has 
significantly larger total and minority populations than Region 1 (Knoxville and Tri-Cities 
region). Though not conclusive evidence of increased competition, we do observe Region 4 
having statistically significant lower prices than Region 1.   
However we do get a strong result from the regression on dbegoal.  Recall the null 
hypothesis stated that participation goals affect project costs. I initially rejected this null 
hypothesis at the 5 percent significance level (p=0.06) but had a possible attenuation bias 
created by the use of historical pricing in formulating the ECE. Though I was unable to 
determine a marginal effect at the 5 percent level of significance, more conclusive results 
were obtained on average effects of project goals.  The model represented by Equation (2) 
gave a stronger and conclusive result indicating an average cost increase for goal projects 
exceeding 4 percent. The confidence level for this result exceeded 99 percent.   
                                                 
14
 The number of firms was taken from a July 25, 2008 listing of the Tennessee Uniform Certification Program.  
A large percentage of these were not active participants.  According to information from TDOT‟s Civil Rights 
Division, less than half of the Tennessee firms received a subcontract during the study period. 
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In this study period, my model indicates that DBE subcontracting goals have an effect 
on costs in Tennessee highway construction. I conclude that shadow costs occur because 
participation goal requirements create a binding constraint on the selection of subcontracting 
firms.  Though there is a strong inference that DBE subcontractors command higher prices 
than their displaced competitors, it is possible that increased prices result from the mandate 
merely adding additional subcontractors to a project or other factors.  Any factor increasing 
project complexity or introducing additional uncertainty would increase costs. However the 
magnitude of the shadow cost coefficient and the existence of „front‟ companies imply that 
DBE firms can command higher prices.  My findings seem consistent with the earlier 
referenced work of Marion in California highway contracting.
15
   
I recommend that TDOT carefully establish annual participation goals at levels such 
that disadvantaged firms can achieve participation at its „natural level‟ as defined by the 
Supreme Court‟s Adarand decision. We can determine just how costly small increases in 
annual goals might be.  From Figure A1, we note the variation in annual goals in FFY 2006 – 
2008.  In FFY 2007 the annual goal increased to 9.87 percent versus 8.48 percent in the 
previous year only to fall to 8.38 percent in FFY 2008.  These differences translate to a year-
to-year taxpayer cost difference of over $2 million.
16
 Clearly TDOT must define these annual 
goals carefully and not specify goals in excess of those justified. 
Various factors limit the supply of available DBE subcontracting services.  They 
include barriers to entry and limited access to capital.  The current cap on personal net worth 
                                                 
15
 He concluded that affirmative action increased prices because prime contractors lacked flexibility to choose a 
different mix of subcontractors or perform more work with their own forces.  
  
16
 DBE goal projects were approximately $400 million annually during the study period. Using the slope 
coefficient of  0.380,  $400 million x 0.38 x 1.4 percent > $2 million 
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for eligible individuals is $750,000 and has not been revised since 1999.  Assuming this 1999 
standard was valid at that time, federal policy makers should raise this cap consistent with the 
increases in inflation and open up the market to more persons.  Also, TDOT must increase its 
efforts in recruiting and training potential DBE owners.  Any efforts resulting in increasing 
the number and quality of these firms will enhance competition in this market and reduce the 
current shadow cost.  
The analysis considers only short-run cost effects with all factors fixed. The program 
accrues long-run benefits by positively influencing social welfare. The cost of these benefits 
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Figure A1. TDOT Annual Participation Goals 
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Figure A2. TDOT Projected Participation Goal FFY 2009 



















Figure A3. TDOT  Regional Organization   























Figure A4. TDOT DBE Solicitation 
Taken from Reference [16] 
















































 laward Dependent Variable – Log Winning Bid 
dbegoal Project Participation Goal  
dbepart Dummy Variable –  Participation Goal 
PParParticipationGoalGoal lestamt Log of TDOT Cost Estimate  (ECE) 
qtybids Number of Bids Received 
biddist Contractor‟s Proximity to Project (miles) 
ltime Log Time (days from bid to completion) 
date) major Indicator Variable – Major* Work Item 
landscape Indicator Variable – Landscaping 
resurface Indicator Variable – Resurfacing 
other Indicator Variable – Other Work 
regX Geographic Dummy Variable 
inshwy Dummy Variable – Interstate Highway 
ushwy Dummy Variable – US Highway Route 
srhwy Dummy Variable – State Route Highway 
city Dummy Variable – City Street 
ctyroad Dummy Variable- County Road 
misc Dummy Variable – Other Location 
ffyXX Dummy Variable – Federal Fiscal Year 
 
*A major work item is defined as any combination of bridge work, paving, and grading.  
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Table A2. Summary Statistics-All Observations 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      laward 1085 13.51204 1.221522 9.349145 18.46632 
awardamt* 1085 2106874 6389294 11489 1.05E+08 
      dbegoal 1085 0.013005 0.029193 0 0.1 
dbepart 1085 0.190783 0.393100 0 1 
lestamt 1085 13.58661 1.186630 9.9711 18.37954 
estimatedamt* 1085 2187744 6277549 21399 9.60E+07 
qtybids 1085 2.740092 1.509718 1 9 
biddist 1085 80.74747 110.0358 0 783 
ltime 1085 5.463661 0.532734 4.110874 7.25982 
projtime* 1085 278.3871 200.2123 61 1422 
      major 1085 0.358525 0.479789 0 1 
landscape 1085 0.001843 0.042914 0 1 
resurface 1085 0.392627 0.488560 0 1 
other 1085 0.303226 0.459864 0 1 
      reg1 1085 0.269124 0.443709 0 1 
reg2 1085 0.221198 0.415245 0 1 
reg3 1085 0.262673 0.440289 0 1 
reg4 1085 0.247005 0.431468 0 1 
      inshwy 1085 0.125346 0.331263 0 1 
ushwy 1085 0.200000 0.400185 0 1 
srhwy 1085 0.398157 0.489744 0 1 
city 1085 0.076498 0.265915 0 1 
ctyroad 1085 0.073733 0.261456 0 1 
misc 1085 0.119816 0.324896 0 1 
      ffy05 1085 0.247005 0.431468 0 1 
ffy06 1085 0.266359 0.442258 0 1 
ffy07 1085 0.224885 0.417699 0 1 
ffy08 1085 0.246083 0.430926 0 1 
ffy09 1085 0.015668 0.124246 0 1 
 




Table A3. Summary Statistics-Reduced Data Set 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      laward 1039 13.62164 1.124726 11.53084 18.46632 
awardamt* 1039 2197167 6514575 101807.8 1.05E+08 
      dbegoal 1039 0.013580 0.029701 0 0.1 
dbepart 1039 0.199230 0.399614 0 1 
lestamt 1039 13.68575 1.108338 11.49137 18.37954 
estimatedamt* 1039 2280418 6399308 97868 9.60E+07 
qtybids 1039 2.748797 1.518491 1 9 
biddist 1039 78.88065 107.7139 0 783 
ltime 1039 5.467898 0.534755 4.110874 7.25982 
projtime* 1039 280.1059 203.0152 61 1422 
      major 1039 0.369586 0.482925 0 1 
landscape 1039 0.001925 0.043853 0 1 
resurface 1039 0.410010 0.492072 0 1 
other 1039 0.277190 0.447827 0 1 
      reg1 1039 0.267565 0.442903 0 1 
reg2 1039 0.225217 0.417926 0 1 
reg3 1039 0.254091 0.435558 0 1 
reg4 1039 0.253128 0.435013 0 1 
      inshwy 1039 0.124158 0.329920 0 1 
ushwy 1039 0.200193 0.400337 0 1 
srhwy 1039 0.406160 0.491352 0 1 
city 1039 0.069297 0.254082 0 1 
ctyroad 1039 0.075072 0.263635 0 1 
misc 1039 0.118383 0.323217 0 1 
      ffy05 1039 0.248316 0.432244 0 1 
ffy06 1039 0.267565 0.442903 0 1 
ffy07 1039 0.223292 0.416653 0 1 
ffy08 1039 0.245428 0.430548 0 1 
ffy09 1039 0.015399 0.123195 0 1 
 
*Corresponding level values of the logarithmic forms 
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Table A4. Regression Results-Reduced Data Set 
Number of obs = 1039 
F( 18,  1020) = 2943.36 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.9793 
Root MSE = 0.16332 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
       dbegoal*    0.379987 0.202769 1.87 0.061 -0.017906 0.777879 
lestamt*** 1.002061 0.006910 145.01 0.000 0.988501 1.015621 
qtybids*** -0.027530 0.004044 -6.81 0.000 -0.035464 -0.019600 
major 0.012538 0.025265 0.50 0.620 -0.037040 0.062116 
resurface -0.003828 0.027618 -0.14 0.890 -0.058024 0.050367 
landscape 0.089694 0.220235 0.41 0.684 -0.342471 0.521859 
other -0.015150 0.021911 -0.69 0.489 -0.058147 0.027847 
ffy05 -0.003069 0.016919 -0.18 0.856 -0.036268 0.030131 
ffy06 -0.010209 0.014674 -0.70 0.487 -0.039004 0.018587 
ffy07 -0.013267 0.013963 -0.95 0.342 -0.040665 0.014133 
reg2 -0.025764 0.015806 -1.63 0.103 -0.056780 0.005252 
reg3 -0.012415 0.014099 -0.88 0.379 -0.040081 0.015250 
reg4*** -0.047990 0.014702 -3.26 0.001 -0.076839 -0.019142 
inshwy -0.007955 0.025430 -0.31 0.754 -0.057856 0.041946 
ushwy 0.027597 0.022861 1.21 0.228 -0.017262 0.072456 
srhwy** 0.046576 0.023097 2.02 0.044 0.001253 0.091899 
city 0.021864 0.033738 0.65 0.517 -0.044340 0.088067 
ctyroad 0.031357 0.029452 1.06 0.287 -0.026436 0.089150 
_cons -0.020604 0.097822 -0.21 0.833 -0.212559 0.171352 
 
***,   **,      *  Indicates confidence levels of 99%, 95%, and 90% respectively 
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Table A5. Regression Results-Average Cost Effects  
Number of obs = 1039 
F( 18,  1020) = 2957.53 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.9794 
Root MSE = 0.16304 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
       dbepart***    0.041291 0.014507 2.85 0.005 0.012824 0.069757 
lestamt*** 0.999249 0.006979 143.18 0.000 0.985554 1.012943 
qtybids*** -0.027514 0.004032 -6.82 0.000 -0.035425 -0.019603 
major 0.010708 0.025230 0.42 0.671 -0.038801 0.060218 
resurface -0.007176 0.027239 -0.26 0.792 -0.060627 0.046275 
landscape 0.092260 0.216342 0.43 0.670 -0.332266 0.516786 
other -0.016202 0.021860 -0.74 0.459 -0.059098 0.026693 
ffy05 -0.006355 0.017076 -0.37 0.710 -0.039863 0.027153 
ffy06 -0.011877 0.014762 -0.80 0.421 -0.040844 0.017090 
ffy07 -0.014838 0.014065 -1.05 0.292 -0.042437 0.012761 
reg2 -0.025131 0.015632 -1.61 0.108 -0.055805 0.005543 
reg3 -0.011899 0.014020 -0.85 0.396 -0.039411 0.015612 
reg4*** -0.048027 0.014668 -3.27 0.001 -0.076811 -0.019243 
inshwy -0.011169 0.025408 -0.44 0.660 -0.061026 0.038688 
ushwy 0.027471 0.022774 1.21 0.228 -0.017218 0.072159 
srhwy** 0.046533 0.022965 2.03 0.043 0.001469 0.091597 
city 0.021254 0.033532 0.63 0.526 -0.044546 0.087054 
ctyroad 0.029369 0.029522 0.99 0.320 -0.028561 0.087299 
_cons 0.019096 0.099095 0.19 0.847 -0.175357 0.213549 
 








Table B1. Regression Results-Full Data Set (with all explanatory variables) 
Number of obs = 1085 
F( 20,  1064) = 2507.95 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.9794 
Root MSE = 0.17692 
      Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>t     [95% Conf. Interval]  
       dbegoal 0.136901 0.222051 0.62 0.538 -0.298807 0.572609 
lestamt*** 1.016655 0.008059 126.15 0.000 1.000841 1.032469 
qtybids*** -0.027400 0.004217 -6.50 0.000 -0.035675 -0.019125 
ltime 0.002059 0.018497 0.11 0.911 -0.034236 0.038354 
biddist 0.000049 0.000056 0.87 0.382 -0.000061 0.000159 
major* 0.044917 0.026689 1.68 0.093 -0.007453 0.097287 
resurface 0.029312 0.031132 0.94 0.347 -0.031775 0.090398 
landscape 0.120302 0.268891 0.45 0.655 -0.407314 0.647918 
other -0.016370 0.023399 -0.70 0.484 -0.062288 0.029540 
ffy05 -0.000727 0.017479 -0.04 0.967 -0.035024 0.033571 
ffy06 -0.012711 0.014877 -0.85 0.393 -0.041904 0.016480 
ffy07 -0.014080 0.015304 -0.92 0.358 -0.044109 0.015950 
reg2 -0.008329 0.016854 -0.49 0.621 -0.041399 0.024742 
reg3 -0.009442 0.015450 -0.61 0.541 -0.039759 0.020874 
reg4** -0.039770 0.016247 -2.45 0.015 -0.071649 -0.007891 
inshwy -0.032342 0.026696 -1.21 0.226 -0.084724 0.020040 
ushwy 0.002086 0.023830 0.09 0.930 -0.044673 0.048846 
srhwy 0.033031 0.023083 1.43 0.153 -0.012261 0.078324 
city -0.027124 0.038082 -0.71 0.476 -0.101847 0.047600 
ctyroad 0.018029 0.029877 0.60 0.546 -0.040596 0.076653 
_cons** -0.253534 0.116321 -2.18 0.030 -0.481780 -0.025290 
 




Table B2. Regression Results-Full Data Set (with significant explanatory variables) 
Number of obs = 1085 
F( 18,  1066) = 2749.74 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.9794 
Root MSE = 0.17683 
      Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
       dbegoal 0.136316 0.212847 0.64 0.522 -0.281330 0.553961 
lestamt*** 1.017364 0.007238 140.56 0.000 1.003162 1.031566 
qtybids*** -0.027137 0.004210 -6.45 0.000 -0.035398 -0.018876 
major 0.042334 0.026457 1.60 0.110 -0.009580 0.094247 
resurface 0.025600 0.029227 0.88 0.381 -0.031750 0.082949 
landscape 0.116035 0.269084 0.43 0.666 -0.411958 0.644028 
other -0.016530 0.023051 -0.72 0.474 -0.061757 0.028702 
ffy05 -0.000531 0.017465 -0.03 0.976 -0.034803 0.033736 
ffy06 -0.013085 0.014870 -0.88 0.379 -0.042263 0.016093 
ffy07 -0.014023 0.015292 -0.92 0.359 -0.044029 0.015984 
reg2 -0.007228 0.016765 -0.43 0.666 -0.040123 0.025668 
reg3 -0.009355 0.015418 -0.61 0.544 -0.039608 0.020898 
reg4** -0.040466 0.015903 -2.54 0.011 -0.071671 -0.009260 
inshwy -0.031582 0.026340 -1.20 0.231 -0.083266 0.020102 
ushwy 0.001700 0.023963 0.07 0.943 -0.045320 0.048720 
srhwy 0.032090 0.023337 1.38 0.169 -0.013702 0.077882 
city -0.026728 0.038072 -0.70 0.483 -0.101433 0.047977 
ctyroad 0.017315 0.029860 0.58 0.562 -0.041277 0.075907 
_cons** -0.245894 0.102517 -2.40 0.017 -0.447052 -0.044740 
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